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“Sublime Labours” : Blake, Nietzsche 
and the Notion of the Sublime
I
In Jerusalem Blake inscribes the philosophy of sublime into the logic 
of contraries, the most powerful machinery of his thought. In the frontispiece 
of an early version of the poem we read that the landscape of Albion is for­
med by two principal “rocks” of “Sublime and Pathos” 1 which, however, are 
locked in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they are seats of so­
lidity, foundational rocks upon which 
things can be built (“fix’d in the Earth”, 
J. 1.4), but — on the other hand — they 
are not readily available as such, their 
solidity is suppressed by the “Spectrous 
Power” of “reason” which “covers them 
above”. There are, at least, two impor­
tant consequences of such a positioning 
of sublime. First, its foundational, ori- 
ginary, character must be validated by 
its Other — in this case the pathetic; 
if sublime is at the beginning of things then it is a beginning already doubled 
and divided (it is important to mark this initial dependence of sublime on 
the Other, as we shall come back to this crucial relationship later on). Second, 
the geological placing of the two rocks implies that a considerable effort 
and investment of energy must be made in order to excavate them from
1*Ail the quotations from Blake come from William Blake: Complete Writings, ed. G. Keynes 
(Oxford: 1969 ) and are marked either by the initial of the title of a prophetic book followed by the 
plate and line number, or — in case of minor texts — by the letter K and the page reference.
The combination of pathos and sub­
lime could possibly signal Blake’s 
allegiance to the 18th-century aes­
thetics. In 1696 John Dennis was 
“led to reduce art to the expression 
of passion”, and in this way “the 
sublime and the pathetic begin their 
long journey in each other’s com­
pany”.
(W.H. Monk, The Sublime. A Study o f Critical 
Theories in XVIII-Century England (New 
York: 1935), p. 46)
underneath layers of soil, Le. rationalist disfigurement Thus, sublime must 
be penetrated into or towards, it is not readily available on the surface, 
and the ontological setting of the frontispiece which speaks of “a Void 
outside of Existence” which, in turn, “becomes a Womb” relegates this 
penetration both to the sphere of sexuality and a primeval territory of 
formative movements. We may refer to this realm as to a region of 
‘onto-geology’.
Sublime qualifies the boundary realm between ‘being’ and ‘not being’, the 
domain where a yet unformed entity acquires the status of a ‘thing’ 
(a movement and change from a “Void” to a “Womb”) without losing sight of 
the nothing and absence which it carries at its center (here, after Lacan2, one 
could claim that sublime is a rediscovery of the signifier which is a representation 
of a certain absence). But it also carries energies of the movement of rocks, in 
short — of a cataclysmic earthquake. This ‘onto-geological’ interpretation of 
sublime can be looked upon as Blake’s philosophical rendition of the popular
. . . .  . ,  , . aesthetics of the romantic northern... if we consider the whole surface , r , . . ,
of it [the earth] ... ‘tis as a broken subhme of ra^ ed mountains and con- 
and confus’d heap of bodies, plac’d torted landscapes (itself founded, in 
in no order to one another, nor with part, upon Burnet’s 1684 Sacred Theory 
any correspondence or regularity of 0f  the Earth), but also — more impor-
parts They [moon and earth] tant] _  it fc supported by Blake’s
a re ... the image or picture of a great . . „  , „  . ,
Ruine, and have a true aspect of theology of a God suffering and com-
a World lying in its rubbish”. passionate rather than a God tnum-
(T. Burnet, Sacred Theory o f the Earth, (Lon- phant and punishing (‘T h e  long Suf-
don: 1684), p. 109) fe rin g s  o f  G o d  a f e  n o t  fo r  e v e r”)_ A  d is .
covery of the sublime is matched not with mere awe and stasis of astonishment 
but with the dynamic of suffering and distortion.
n
The placement of the sublime at the junction of ‘being’ and ‘not-being’, in 
the territory of ‘onto-geology’, is strategic because it enforces the sublime as the 
most central power in Blake’s aesthetics and his critical assessment of Western 
philosophy3. Thus, the “sublime labours” about which Blake speaks in Plate 
10 of Jerusalem refer partly to his efforts to create a new philosophical 
discourse which would overcome the strict distinctions of genres and result in 
the hybridic form of ‘Philosophy as Art’, or ‘Art as Philosophy’, a discourse 
based not upon merely rational inferment but, primarily, upon the aesthetic
1 See, e.g. J. Lacan, Seminaire I II  (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
3 On the topic of Blake and sublime see V. de Luca, Words o f Eternity. Blake and the Poetics 
of the Sublime (Princetown: Princeton University Press, 1991).
contemplation and practice of the everyday. The reverence for the Other 
implies ethical response founded upon necessarily aesthetic recognition of the 
Other’s separateness. Thus, Blake’s theory of the outline plays such a vital role 
in his system.
In his annotations to Reynolds’ Discourses Blake radically opposes his 
adversary’s view according to which the “grand style” consists in the escape 
from the „Gothic manner which attends to the minute accidental dis­
criminations of p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s ” and locates “sublimity” precisely 
in the area of “discriminations”; “All Sublimity is founded on Minute 
Discriminations” (K, 453). Sublime marks then three significant moments 
in man’s conceptualization of the world: first, it enforces a certain theory 
of arts based on the ontological importance of outline; second, it pos­
tulates the end of the universal, all inclusive knowledge opening, instead, 
the space for a new protocol of knowledge forming in which cen­
trality is replaced by the periphery, and one supreme narration of the 
system substituted by local stories of particular objects (‘T o  Generalize is 
to be an idiot. To Particularize is the Alone Distinction of Merit. Gene­
ral Knowledges are those knowledges, that Idiots possess”, K, 451); third, 
it emphasizes the role of the individual vis a vis the systematic, the impul­
sive vis a vis the reasoning (“I have always found that Angels have the 
vanity to speak of themselves as the only wise; this they do with a confi­
dent insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning”, K, 157). It is surprising 
that Blake mercifully chose not to comment at length of the passage in the 
same Discourse in which the survey of the “grand style” is preceded by the oath 
of loyalty to the political regime and social establishment Paving the way for 
praising the authorities for opening the Royal Academy as the place of artistic 
formation, Reynolds speaks of “a general desire among our nobility to be 
distinguished by lovers and judges of the arts”, and then hastens to praise the 
Monarch (George III) for his generosity urging the artists to show their 
gratitude: „let us shew our gratitude in our diligence, t h a t ... at least... our 
industry may deserve his protection”4. Evidently, for Blake, for whom “the 
tygers of wrath are wiser that the horses of instruction” (K, 152), such a pledge 
of allegiance was bound to produce not only politically but, first of all, 
aesthetically devastating results which privileged the art of blurred chiaroscuro 
(Titian, and the Venetians) over that of the clear outline (Rafael). Hence, the 
three principal domains of sublime — aesthetic, epistemological (philo­
sophical), and political — coalesce into one: theory (and practice) of Minute 
Particulars.
4J. Reynolds, Discourses on Art (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 6.
i n
Minute Particulars lead to a philosophy of the body which is based on (1) 
its liberation from the powers of ideological disfigurement, and (2) the 
sublimation of the body’s understanding as merely a conglomerate of physiolo­
gically specialized organs. Blake’s sublime is that of the body but conceived of 
in a special way, as the body r a d i c a l l y  naked, Le. a body r e fu s in g  to 
ide n t i fy  i ts ow n ,  u l t i m a t e  n a k e d n e s s  w i th  th e  sexual .  What is 
perceived as the sexual liberation and ‘baring’ of the body is, according to 
Blake, merely a clever attempt at imposing an ideological ’’veil” (a frequent 
term in Blake’s books) neutralizing the revolutionary nudity of man’s body. 
Blake’s is not the desexualized body, but a body whose sexuality remains more 
mysterious and open, more ‘naked’, thus not restricted to the genital zone, 
a b o d y  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  s e x u a l i t i e s  (in the plural) — a body sublime which 
differentiates its sexual practices refusing to identify and lock them in the 
sphere of the genital.
In Plate 69 of Jerusalem Blake surrounds the crucial claim that “Every 
Minute Particular is Holy” (J, 69,42) with the images of two kinds of sexuality. 
First, he presents us with the “jealous” and “murderous” sexuality of Rahab, 
the ancient whore of Babylon, which inscribes the body into social economy 
(marriage as a system of social exchange: “The Female searches sea & land for 
gratifications to the/Male Genius, who in return clothes her in gems & gold”) 
and restrictive, conventional law (“A Religion of Chastity, forming a Commer­
ce to sell Loves”, see also The system o f Moral Virtue named Rahab, J. 39, 10). 
Second, Blake depicts the body of Beulah and of “the sanctuary of Eden”, 
where “Embraces are Cominglings from the Head even to the Feet”, i.e. where 
the holiness of “Minute Particulars” is opposed to the false pathetic or 
“pomposity” of Generalized Knowledge (“a pompous High Priest”).
One should also note how the sublime body of displaced sexuality is 
implicated in the philosophy of outline. On the one hand, it is totally 
dependent on the contour and circumference (“For the Sanctuary of Eden is in 
the Camp, in the Outline”, J, 69. 41), on the other hand, however, its power 
seems to transcend the limitations of the visual outline. We learn that “the 
Circumference still expands going forward to Eternity” (J, 71. 8), from which we 
can infer that the experience of the sublimity of the everyday is conditioned by 
two things; first, by the recognition of the difference, and second — by the 
acknowledgment of the fact that, when absolutized, this rule can turn into its 
own parody, into the Cartesianism of the subject contemplating external 
objects (whereas the sublime seems to be a science of differance in which there 
can be no subject p r i o r  to the otherness of objects).
At this moment a theory of sublime must touch upon a theory of the 
self: in Blake’s version, the road towards sublime must be opened by a radical
critique of the Selfish Center (J, 71. 7). Thus, despite obvious associations with 
closure, Blake’s outline does not homogenize a thing, does not turn it into 
a centralized entity, but just the opposite — it introduces within it openness
and the space for “expansion” which 
instantly derails the object from its 
route towards the center and turns it
One could remark that such a link 
between sublime and self is notice­
able in Lacan’s philosophy of self as 
conditioned by the Other which al­
ways carries within itself a suspicion 
of sublime ‘vastness’ which prevents 
us from getting to know it: “ ‘You 
are my wife’... ‘you are my master’... 
What creates the founding value of 
those words is that what is aimed at 
in the message, as well as what is 
manifest in the pretence, is that the 
Other is there qua absolute Other. 
Absolute, i.e. he is recognised, but is 
not known”.
towards unexpected margins and peri­
pheries. The sublime body is neces­
sarily founded upon the difference, the 
fundamental necessity of the Other, but 
it is not a difference stabilized and 
petrified, identifiable as the ‘sexual’ or 
‘psychological’ difference, but a mo­
ving, ceaseless differentiation which 
prevents man from absolutizing the 
physiology of his/her body’s organs on 
the way towards the discovery of the 
true ‘nakedness’ of the body a b o v e
(J. Lacan, Le séminaire Livre III. Les Psycho­
ses (Paris: 1981, p. 48).
dychotomies. The movement towards the sublime body is then a trajectory 
above sexuality (“Humanity is far above sexual organization”, J, 79. 73), but 
not outside it (“In Beulah the, Female lets down her beautiful tabemac- 
le/Which the Male enters magnificent between her Cherubim/And becomes 
One with, h e r ...”, J, 30. 34—36).
IV
To dismantle the unequivocal and mistifying image of human sexuality as 
a domain of unproblematic gratification, to turn it towards the sublime body, 
Blake speaks about it not only in terms of pleasure but, first of all, of hard 
work. When, at the beginning of Jerusalem, Los forces his Spectre to work with 
him, the stakes are double: to create an option for the philosophy of life as, to 
borrow a term from Nietzsche, a kind of “Joyful Wisdom” (“That 
Enthusiasm and Life may not cease”, J, 9. 31; in Annotations to Reynolds we 
find a most general formula of this philosophy: “Enthusiasm is All in All”, 
K, 456), and to open a perspective for the future rejuvenation of Albion by the 
“Sons and Daughters of Jerusalem to be” (J, 10. 3).
We learn right away that neither of the two purposes is attainable by means 
of either frivolous reflection of academic philosophy, or through an act of 
sexual union. The limitations of both are serious. The former tries to cover up, 
throiigh ideological manouvers, the true reality of “Contraries” neutralized by 
the binarism of dychotomie divisions (‘They take the Two Contraries ... they
name them Good & Evil; From them they make an Abstract, which is
a Negation”, J, 10. 8—10; in a concise formula, we deal with the “Abstract
Philosophy warring in enmity against Imagination”, J, 5. 68). The latter 
attempts to bypass the drama of sexuality by means of its reduction to either 
reproduction or mere pleasure which, in the latter case, subjects it to the 
punitive machinery of the moral law (“Every Emanative joy forbidden, as 
a Crime”, J, 9. 14).
To counter such reductionist approaches Blake focuses on the philosophy 
of labour giving us, more than six decades before Nietzsche, his own version of 
“philosophizing with a hammer” which the German thinker describes in the 
preface to the Twilight o f Idols. Los is presented as a cosmic blacksmith (“Out 
from the Furnaces of Los ... A pillar of smoke writhing afar into Non-Entity, 
Till the cloud reaches... the Starry Wheels”, J, 5.50—52), the master of the 
forge (“The Bellows & the Hammers moved compell’d by Los’s hand”, J, 10. 6), 
the wielder of the hammer and furnaces (“Loud roar my Furnaces and loud my 
hammer is heard”, J, 9. 25), and — last but not least — a commanding force 
(“Groaning the Spectre heav’d the bellows, obeying Los’s frowns”, J, 9. 33).
Blake’s/Los’s philosophy of the hammer is the impassioned, eroticized 
thcjght of “sublime Labours” (J, 10. 65) resulting in two actions: architectural 
construction of the city of Golgonooza, and the sexual generation of “his 
Sons & Daughters”;
Yet ceas’d he [Los] not from labouring at the roarings of his Forge,
With iron & brass Building Golgonooza in great contendings,
Till his Sons & Daughters came forth from the Furnaces
At the sublime Labours ...
(J, 10. 62—65)
If we could trace the reasons why the labours are qualified as “sublime”, we 
would be in a position to see further implications of this adjective in Blake’s 
theory going beyond its already hinted foundation in the notions of the 
“outline” and “Minute Particulars”. First, the labours are designed to curb the 
raging power of unrestricted reason represented by the Spectre itself. Even 
a cursory investigation of Blake’s thought, however, reveals that his reser­
vations concern not so much reason as such (in Jerusalem Blake speaks of the 
“Holy Reasoning Power” J, 10. 13), but its abuse resulting from its eman­
cipation or alienation from other cognitive faculties. Los’s forge is a place 
where the Spectre is again forced to co-operate, Le. to abandon its haughty 
independence described by Blake as “Abomination of Desolation” (J, 10. 16). 
“Sublime” action is possible when reason is subjected to Poetic Imagination, 
when the Spectre “heaves the bellows obeying Los’s frowns”.
Second, such an epistemological turn is implicated in ethical consequences. 
Sublimity is a movement away from the “desolation” introduced by the 
emancipated and insulated reason. If we remember that the term ‘desolation’
3 “The M ost Sublime Act”
speaks of a land unfit for living, friendless, unhospitable, and ruined, we will be 
able to see why in the passage quoted above the forge and the roaring hammer 
announce, in an almost Heideggerian manner, a philosophy of not only 
sexuality but — first of all — dwelling. While creating his “Sons & Daughters” 
Los constructs the city of Golgonooza, Le. a place of hospitality and 
conviviality. In fine, “desolation” eliminates the Other, redounds to the rigidity 
of human selfhood, whereas Golgonooza revives the presence of the Other and, 
hence, makes a turn towards sublime possible. One could argue that Blake’s 
sublime, by betraying the characteristic features of the Romantic sublimity 
embodied so dramatically in Friedrich’s painting A  Monk by the Sea (man’s 
loneliness and fragility vis-à-vis the elemental powers of nature, the case 
illustrating particularly well Kant’s famous dictum that we should look for 
sublime in nature5) is interpretable mainly in ethical categories, as a redis­
covery of the founding role of the Other in the construction of the human 
subject. This reading is not only supported by a famous Proverb of Hell 
according to which “The most sublime act is to set another before you” 
(K, 151), but also by the process of devolution of humanity under the impact of 
the Reasoning Power which neutralizes the Other not by its total erasure but, 
much more treacherously, by the substitution of the Other by the inauthentic 
and reproducible replica. In Blake’s categories: imagination is eliminated — in 
the sphere of the relationship with the Other — by memory:
But Albion fell down, a Rocky fragment from Eternity hurl’d 
By his own Spectre, who is the Reasoning Power in every Man,
Into his own Chaos, which is the Memory between Man & Man.
(J, 54. 6—«)
In other words, the ethical sublime consists in the ability to avoid 
formlessness, or if we could coin a neologism — ‘unformedness’ (Chaos) 
— without, however, petrifying in the solidity of a ‘separate’, ‘unrelated’ 
identity without the Other. This moment of transition, or ‘shuttling’ between 
the formed and unformed (in this context we should also remember Blake’s 
phrase from Visions o f the Daughters o f Albion, where he speaks of the human 
being as of one who “knows no fixed lot”, K, 193) is the key factor in the ethical 
sublime necessarily leading to the implantation of the aesthetic dimension into 
the domain of ethics, since the act of the “sublime Labour”, of hammering one’s 
self, is the act of imagination or artistic creation opposing a merely reproduc­
tive operation of “Memory”.
Third, such a philosophy of self brings us back to human sexuality. At the 
beginning of Jerusalem Blake gives his definition of the sexes as: “The Male is 
a Furnace of beryll; the Female is a golden Loom” (J, 5. 33) which corresponds
5 See I. Kant, Critique o f Judgement, sec. 27.
with the ‘hammering’ and ‘shuttling’ activities outlined above. Los’s “sublime 
Labours” result in the generation of his “Sons & Daughters”, and the adjective 
“sublime” describes less a ‘specialized’ genital operation but, rather, seems 
to refer to the extension of the sexual over all the areas of human body 
and life. Neither is it insignificant that the “Furnaces” produce also Erin, 
Blake’s representative of free love whose praise he sang in Vision of 
the Daughters o f Albion. Eroticization of existence (not to be mixed with 
its ‘genitalization’) is an important undercurrent in Blake’s version of the 
sublime.
Fourth, sublimity also qualifies a certain state of “labour” in a society. 
Acknowledging the importance of Blake’s philosophy of work, which cannot 
be approached in this essay, we can only briefly point out that the “Furnaces” 
of Los, i.e. of eroticized existence of the outlined — but not fixed — self, 
stand in opposition to “dark Satanic Mills” introduced by Blake in the Preface 
to Milton. The latter represent the enslaved labour of the early days of 
Industrial Revolution which confines both man’s body (hence, in Four Zoas 
Blake argues for the liberation of industrial slaves: “Let the slave, grin­
ding at the mill, run out into the field”, FZ, 9. 670) and — more impor­
tantly — mind (“doomed to the sullen contemplation, men in their inner­
most brain/Feeling the crushing W heels... write the bitter words/Of 
Stem Philosophy...”, FZ, 9. 818—820). On the other hand, Los’ “Furnaces” 
stand for the technology not necessarily lighter or less demanding in terms of 
human- effort (we know that “Los compell’d the invisible Spectre to labours 
mighty with vast strength”, J, 10. 65), but the labour, although hard and 
enforced, is sublimated by its purpose, i.e. a construction of New Jerusalem 
(“Los works hard for Jerusalem’s sake”, J, 11.9). In fine, the sublime also 
implies the liberation of labour not from the stress of manual work but, first of 
all, from the confines and restrictions of false ideology which reifies and 
mechanizes man’s thought.
V
Nietzsche, like Blake, would disagree with Kant’s conviction that it 
is in nature where man should look for the examples of the sublime. Blake’s 
“sublime Labours” were meant to emphasize the ontological, epistemological, 
and social status of the sublime which is to redefine human life in terms of excess 
and eroticized thought Similarly, Nietzsche would begin with the following 
reservation: distinguishing sharply between sublime and beautiful (we should 
remember Blake’s distinction between the “rock of sublime” and “the rock of 
pathetic”) he speaks of the latter in terms of a “dream” (Raum), whereas he
Similarly, de Luca speaks of Blake’s addresses the former as the “intoxica-
“eroticized conception of intellect” tion” (Rausch). In the notes we read that
ai?4 defioes sublime poetry as one y  one accepts the view that beauty resi- 
which addresses the Intellectual , „ . , . _ . „ A
Powers by furnishing them with des m the dream of Being then, auto­
forms of desire, with an ongoing matically, he will have to look at the sub­
enticement that releases the uncur- lime as a case of “the intoxication of
bed emanation of passion”. Being” (“Wem das Schöne auf einem
(V. de Luca, Words o f Eternity. Blake and the Traum des Wesens beruht, so das Erha-
Poetics o f the Sublime (Princeton:1991), p. 29) , - . „  , , , , ,  „ 5,v bene auf, einem Rausch des Wesens ).
We have to note that the philosopher approaches beauty and sublime 
applying to them terms well known from his early text on The Birth of 
T-agedy and central to all of his philosophy. Traum brings us to the Apollo­
nian, while Rausch speaks on behalf of the Dionysian. Nietzsche seems to 
be making a point that beautiful belongs to the God of light and sa­
nity, whereas sublime has been appropriated by the frenzy of the God of 
wine and madness, a conclusion justified by the final section of the same 
aphorism: “Das Schöne und das Licht, das Erhabene und das Dunkel” (N I, 
aph. 32).
When it comes to answering the question whether sublime is inherent to 
nature (“Ist das Erhabene der Natur eigentümlich”) Nietzsche’s reaction is 
negative: it turns towards the notions of “will” (Willen) and “measure” (Mass). 
Sublime, unlike beautiful, is generated by the “excessive will” (das Übermass des 
Willens), and by the “overloaded instinct” (überladenen Triebe). Sublimity 
consists in transcending the “measure” which, especially in relation with “will”, 
seems to aim at pointing out the withering of the foundations of the Western 
subject. First of all, man is no longer ‘measurable’, i.e. identifiable as a separate 
and discreet unit in perfect control over both itself (the ‘de-genderization’ of the 
pronoun seems important here) and the world. Rather, human subject is now 
viewed as a temporary and superficial, Apollonian, sovereignity of the 
conscious over the unconscious. The sovereignity which must necessarily be 
overturned, and in this respect Nietzsche’s philosophy of “revaluation of all 
values” (also the revaluation of the accepted hierarchy between the conscious 
and unconscious) is a philosophy of the sublime. If Nietzsche claims that it is 
the Übermass des Willens that brings the experience of the sublime, it is 
tantamount to saying that the sublime stems from the regions of human
®F. Nietzsche, Nachlass I, (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, Verlag, 1943), aph. 32. Nietzsche’s work 
will be referred to by means of the following abbreviations followed by the aphorism number: 
Z — Thus Spake Zarathustra, D — Daybreak, N I — Nachlass I, N II, Nachlass II, GS — Gay 
Science,- WP — Will to Power, KGV — Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, e.g. G. Colli 
and M. Montinari (in this case the first number refers to Abteilung, the secong to the Band, and the 
third to the appropriate fragment).
subjectivity well beyond what Blake would describe as “Selfhood”, and that 
“intoxication” or “ecstasy” (Rausch) are figurative modes of making, the 
sublime available to language and thought. If, for Schopenhauer and Kant, 
sublime spells the essential fissure in the human self which ‘fearlessly’ observes 
itself watch something fearful (a sea-storm, for instance), then for the author of 
The Birth o f Ttagedy sublime marks the rediscovery not so much of a divided 
ego but of a self which keeps endlessly differentiating from itself, a self for which 
the split form of two entities is yet too specific and too definite, the abysmal self 
which — through this differentiation process — radically overcomes the 
Apollonian principium individuationis.
The category of sublime describes a subject which goes beyond the 
“measure” of its own limits, i.e. one which refuses to place itself in the territory 
of appropriateness, both in the sense of ontology (sublime refers to 
the self which is always different, always belongs ‘somewhere else’, is always 
‘im- proper*) and economy (sublime excludes the use of possessive pro­
nouns: “will”, which according to traditional concepts of self consitutes one of 
its most characteristic features, in Nietzsche evidently belongs to the fundamen­
tal process of becoming over which the self extends only a very limited 
dominion).
Sublimity belongs to the domain of terror both ontologically (as it 
unconceals the abysmal structure of existence) and aesthetically (as it spells the 
end of the era of the normative aesthetics of the Age of Reason, but 
simultaneously overcomes the Romantic aesthetics originating — as the 
philosopher claims in the 370 aphorism of The Gay Science — from 
“impoverishment” rather than from “overabundance” of instincts).
The abysmality of existence does not signify, however, the disappearance 
of self (such a claim qualifies in Nietzsche as a romantic yearning for 
“rest, stillness... and redemption from self’, GS, ap. 370), but rather its 
totally different perception along the lines of “eternal return”. When, in the 
same note quoted from Nachlass, Nietzsche speaks about sublimity and 
will, he links them with the idea of Unmermesslichkeit (“Die schaurige 
Empfindung den Unmermesslichkeit des Willens”) to emphasize that neither 
self nor sublime can be exhausted in the traditional “measures” of ‘ego’ and 
‘identity’.
VI
It is precisely the doctrine of “eternal recurrence” that reveals the 
absymality of being in Nietzsche’s thought. Without even trying to approach 
the intricacies of the notion, let us only point out that Wiederkunft is not
Alan Schrift interprets eternal return a return of the same, an exact repetition
in a similar mode: “ what is essen- f occurrence> but _  rather _  it is 
tially at issue is not the fac t  of the
eternal recurrence..., but the our willingness and readiness to ac-
t h o u g h t  of the eternal recurrence, cept the very possibility of things hap-
e.g. the thought that one commits panning to us over and over again.
oneself to performing eternally the s ucb a readiness evidently bespeaks the
actions that one chooses . _  . x ,
(A, Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question o f  affirmative attitude towards reality and
interpretation (New York: 1990), p. 70) thus introduces a dramatic change into
our being which is radically transformed by the very acceptance of 
what Nietzsche calls in Ecce homo “amor fati”. In other words, the affir­
mative, joyful self is never at ease with itself, since — having affir­
med the recurrence — it has become essentialy different from itself. Wieder­
kunft is then a thought of the selfs radical non-identity, fundamental 
non-synonimity with itself. Like in Blake’s doctrine of exuberance and 
excess, the eternal recurrence speaks of the overabundant self, or of the 
Übermensch.
Such a thought implies that even the concept of sublimity cannot be 
used as a final description of a new self. Hence, in Nietzsche, the sublime 
must necessarily be overcome: if the Übermass des Willens is to lead 
to Übermensch, then it must go through the stage of Überwindung (over­
coming). The story of sublime in Nietzsche is ‘un-measured’ in the move­
ment between the three ÜBER-. The first implication of this linguis­
tic topography is that, despite the semantic temptation to read in the 
ÜBER a story of the extraordinary and unsual, Nietzsche painstakingly 
tries to reveal that — paradoxically — it operates in the sphere of the every­
day. In another notebook remark the philosopher says that, when doing what 
one wants to do, one should avoid “lofty words”, i.e. avoidance of the 
rhetorical sublime seems to be a precondition of the sublime experience 
of will: “Sein Liebtes tun, ohne es mit höhen Worten zu nennen — kann 
Heroismus sein Scham vor den erhabenen Gebärden” (N, II, aph. 566). 
Paradoxically, for Nietzsche, the very nature of sublime seems to reside 
in a recurrent movement between the everyday, the estrangement from it, 
followed by a return to the heimlich; the ‘un-measured’ can be approached only 
by means of a “measure”. There is necessarily a sense of ‘thrownness’ in the 
experience of sublime, of being at the mercy of some unidentifiable power, but 
also — if sublime is to run its full course — it must overcome its ‘thrownness’ 
and create its own existential architecture. Both Blake and Nietzsche em­
phasize this architectural turn in the sublime, and in both of them it is a move 
towards a new sense of dwelling in which the aesthetic would merge with the 
ethical and ontological. Hence, the city of Golgonooza which is being forged 
in the Furnaces of Los, and Nietzsche’s sense of the necessity of ‘do-
The process of the necessary domes- mestication’ of sublime: “Wer im Er-
tication of the sublime, of learning habenen nicht zu Hause ist, fühlt das
how to be at home in a setting which Erhabene als etwas Unheimliche^ und
demes at- homeness resembles the „  . , „ T . non\ -n. ur
relationship between man and mea- Falsches (N, I, aph. 780) The sublime
ning in Lacan: “Meaning is the fact can onty be experienced as its own
that the human being isn’t master of overcoming: we know what it is, when
this primordial, primitive language. We begin to feel ‘at home’ with it,
He has been thrown into i t ... Here although the very tradition of sublime
man isn t master m his own house , r  .. r .. . r . defines it as exactly the experience of not(J. Lacan, Le séminaire. Livre II, (Pans: 1978), „ . , , . . .
p. 307). being at home with something.
The overcoming (Überwindung) is signalled in The Daybreak where 
Nietzsche warns us that sublimity can be frequently falsified by pretentious 
neglect of the natural suppressed by the spiritual. In this sense we can say that 
a false sublime, i.e. a not overcome sublime results from a certain — as 
Heidegger would have put it — forgetfulness o f Being. As we can clearly see 
from the 261 aphorism of 77ie Daybreak, the sublime can be overcome by its 
own critique as a movement only apparently ennobling man by transporting 
him to some more lofty areas of being. When Nietzsche strips man of the 
pretences of divinity and rediscovers the animal in him (in the aforementioned 
aphorism he speaks of the “animal”, Getier, which pretentiously walks on two 
legs, whereas it is much more natural on all fours), he launches a vitriolic attack 
on Kant and Schopenhauer for whom sublime consisted in the intimation of im­
mortality, in the “supersensible side of our being” (Critique o f Judgement, sec. 27).
The first step in experiencing sublime consists in recognizing its false 
pretences, ie. in emphasizing that a true sublime can only be available as 
a sublime a rebours (not a “god”, but an “animal” in man). The next stage is 
opened by a shock of this discovery. The not overcome sublime has a tendency 
to produce a satisfied man, a man who is “free, strong, broad, peaceful, and 
gay” {frei, fest, breit, ruhig, heiter, N I, aph. 779), whereas the principle of the 
Dionysian philosophy of the disturbed principium individuationis demands the 
shattering of the limits of such a self.
This can be achieved through the experience of the “perfect beauty” (Volkomen- 
nen Schönen) which excruciates and deranges one’s self. Like in his theory of 
tragedy where Dionysus had to, ultimately, speak the language of Apollo, the 
sublime, when filtered from false and pathetic elements, will become the paralyzing 
force of the beautiful. In a Nachlass note we read: “Der Mensch des Erhabenen 
wird beim Anblick des Erhabenen frei, breit, ruhig, heiter; aber der Anblick des 
Volkomennes Schönen erschütert ihm und wirft ihn um: vor ihm verneint er sich 
selbes”, N, I aph. 779). The violent rhetoric of “shattering” (erschütert), “rejection” 
{umwerferi), and “negation” (verneinen) makes one aware that a true sublime must 
be overcome and brought to the area of the r a d i c a l l y  beautiful (what is at 
stake is not just merely “beautiful” but “perfectly beautiful”).
The completion of this process of Überwindung is presented in the 13th 
chapter of the second book of Zarathustra appropriately entitled “On the 
sublime ones” (Von den Erhabenen). A sublime person is the embodiment of 
a false, i.e. not overcome, sublime which does not remain in any relationship 
with beauty and which represents the force of the pathetic Nietzsche was 
alluding to in the passage from The Daybreak quoted above. Now, the sublime 
man is referred to not as a fake divinity (“wie ein Gott", D, aph. 261), but as 
a “penitent of spirit” (einen Büsser des Geistes). This description introduces the 
sublime man into the heart of the epistemological debate taking place in 
Nietzsche’s works. The “penitent of spirit” is one who adheres to the model of 
science which focuses on the security and stability of truth. N ot überwänden 
sublime represents the Cartesian model of the lofty thinking responsible for 
‘transporting’ man to the ‘heights’ of cognition.'
But it is precisely this model which Nietzsche attacks in his books accusing 
it of absolutising one point of view as well as trustifying the role of language in 
the process of knowledge formation. We see now why the “penitent of spirit” is 
laden with “ugly truths” (Behängt mit hässlichen Wahrheiten): for Nietzsche, it is 
indispensible to underscore the fact that his new, “joyful” knowledge, the 
knowledge of the overcome sublime, deals not with truths but with values.  
The overcoming of sublime, like the overturning of the knowledge of Bacon, 
Newton, and Locke in Blake’s thought, implies a movement towards “light­
ness” (See the importance of the metaphore of dance for both thinkers) and art. 
In Blake, the latter takes the form of a most intricate theory of imagination 
which becomes a metaphysical nature of man’s being (“Art is the Tree of Life ... 
Science is a Tree of Death”, K, 777); similarly, we can learn from Nietzsche that 
“art is the greatest Stimulans of life” (WP, 808) and that “our fundamental 
intellectual life” is nothing else but a “spontaneous play of phantasizing force”, 
KGV, V, 1:10). It cannot surprise us then that the “penitent of spirit”, i.e. the 
unovercome sublime, does not locate itself on the level of “taste” and “liking” 
(Geschmack und Schmecken), and therefore turns out to be the enemy of life 
itself which, as we learn from the same chapter of Zarathustra, is unthinkable 
without debates over taste.
The first movement, however, leads us away from the “spirit of the heavy” 
(Geist der Schwere, Z, 111:11) towards the new knowledge represented not
Monk notices that already Monlaig- b* merel>’ ralional T erence and ex-
ne “laments the loss of the sub- perxment assuming the fundamental
lime ... and he blames this state of split between subject/object and
affairs on ‘this new philosophy, mind/body, but by the non-dychoto-
which tells only of general laws’ and mi physiological or __ rather BIO-
which speaking only of pure unders- , . , P , , ,  ,
tanding, of clear ideas, of reasons, of S1 response of laughter. The two 
principles’ neglects imagination...” movements are strictly connected in
(W.H. Monk, The Sublime..., p. 55) Nietzsche and, hence, when presenting
the “penitent of spirit”, he can point out in one sentence that he mas­
tered neither laughter nor beauty (Noch lernte er das Lachen nicht und die 
Schömheit), and as a result ‘ sad left the forest of cognition” (Walde der 
Erkenntnis).
The overcoming of sublime implies then a corrective of the cognitive 
by the aesthetic (art more important than knowledge: “Art is worth more 
than truth”, WP, aph. 853), and then another sanative procedure — this 
time of the aesthetic by the biological (life more important than art: “We 
possess art lest we perish of the truth”, WP, aph. 822, Le. art has such 
an enormous value because it is the saving power of life). Such a critique of the 
sublime, like in Blake, involves a certain psychological model of man. For 
Blake, the ideal was provided by the creative impulse identified with disin- 
stitutionalized Christianity (A Poet, a Painter, a Musician, an Architect: the 
Man or Woman who is not one of these is not a Christian, K, 776); Nietzsche, 
a violent critic of the Christian tradition, presents his model as that of man 
freed from tH, internalised pressures of ideology. This essential point acquires 
a most complete metaphorical representation at the very beginning of 
Zarathustra in the famous parable of metamorphoses (Von den drei Verwan­
dlungen) in which man’s transformation is pursued from the stage of the camel 
to that- of the child, but in the context of Nietzsche’s discussion of sublime 
a more physiological equivalent is used. “The penitent of spirit” is a “tense 
soûl” (gespannte Seele), i.e. one unable to experience joy and paralyzed 
by the restrictions of preconceived ideas. Thus, the overcoming of sub­
lime implies a relaxation of the muscular tension (mit lässigen Muskeln) of the 
body.
The problem with the sublime seems, for Nietzsche, to consist in the fact 
that in its classic formulations (like in Kant, Burke, or Hegel) it remains too 
restrictive and well-defined (too muscularily “tense”), too foreseeable and 
normative, whereas the sublime must reject all thought of self-identity. Sublime 
is what is more than itself, what — never satisfied with itself — goes beyond 
itself (that is why Nietzsche could talk about a ‘strong’ but ‘relaxed’ body 
without tension), and therefore overcoming must be its essential prerequisite 
(hence even will, Nietzsche’s crucial concept, must be overmastered by a new 
hero), but such a placing of the sublime inevitably turns it into beautiful. Thus 
in the chapter “On the sublime ones” the philosopher can claim that the 
sublime man must actualize his/her desire not in “satisfaction” (Sattheit) but in 
“Beauty” which is defined in terms opposite to the traditional presentation of 
the sublime; no longer do we undergo a movement upwards towards ‘invisible’ 
heights, an ascent, no longer do we speak of ‘transportation’ to the ‘heights’ but 
— contrariwise — about a descent, a movement d o w n w a r d s  towards the 
visibility (Sichtbare): Nietzsche clearly defines beautiful as a “descent towards
visibility” (“Wenn die Macht, gnädig 
wird herabkommt ins Sichtbare: 
Schönheit heisse, ich solches Herab­
kommen”) which radically opposes 
Kant’s “supersensuality” and speaks of 
Nietzsche’s attachment to the everyday 
which, in turn, in Heidegger’s inter­
pretation means that “the sensuous 
stands in a higher place and is more 
genuinely than the supersensuous”7.
That in this movement Nietzsche 
betrays romantic principles of sub­
limity becomes evident from this 
presentation of the romantic sublime 
which focuses on the exactly op­
posite turn of sublime: “The mo­
ment of the sublime is that moment 
before the visible dissolves ind with’ 
it .the poet’s ability to make sense of 
impressions in words”.
(J. Twitchell, Romantic Horizons. Aspects o f 
the Sublime in English Poetry and Painting,
1770-1850 (Columbia: 1983), p. 16)
In the same chapter of Zarathustra Nietzsche suggests that the direction of the 
metamorphosis taking place in the overcome sublime leads us away from sublime 
itself towards the elevated. Man should be “elevated” rather than “sublime”, 
Gehobener not Erhabener. This positioning of the sublime as a new, redirected 
elevation in which sublime is transformed into beautiful is also manifest in 
Nietzsche’s presentation of “grand style” as the supreme example of the art of the 
Dionysian Rausch. According to the paradoxical nature of such a sublime (which 
can be such only after having turned into beautiful), the grand style is defined as 
precisely the domain of “measure”, although this measure is not a mere 
intermediary between the extremes. Grand style occurs where there takes place 
“a triumph over the plenitude of living things; where measure becomes master” 
(WP, 819). A long detour brings us back to the question of Mass with which we
started; this time, however, only to point out that there can be no art possible
without a measure, and thus that sublime MUST be overcome partly for philo­
sophical and ethical reasons (as clearing the way for a new type of consciousness 
ready to accept and say YES to the destabilizing paradoxes of becoming rather 
than sanctify the immobilizing logic of being) and partly for the reasons of the
logic of aesthetic production which 
is founded upon the abysmal and un­
measurable flight/fall following the 
death of God (see, The Gay Science, 
aph. 125), but which can depict and 
think this new situation of humanity 
only by reintroducing the idea of mea­
sure which allows both chaos and law 
to unfold. The new measure of the 
overcome sublime, Le. of the new beautiful, represents precisely this Mass 
which, remaining itself beyond measure (unermesslich), conditions both disar­
ray, and order, the Apollonian and the Dionysian.
Similarly, Alexander Nehamas noti­
ces that “Nietzsche would not accept 
Aristotle’s view that moderation ... 
consists in a mean between excess 
and defect: these are for him the 
materials through which a higher 
synthesis, which he sometimes calls 
‘the grand style’, may emerge”.
(A. Nehamas, Nietzsche. Life as Literature, 
(Cambridge Mass.: 1985), p. 193)
7 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume One: The Will to Power as Art, English trans. D. Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 198.
